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Abstract
This Article explores the legal manifestation of the interaction between the general public
and the public corporation. Revisiting team production analysis, this Article redefines the cor-
porate team and argues that while several constituencies indeed form part of the corporate team,
others are exogenous to the corporate enterprise. Employees, suppliers and financiers contribute
together to the common corporate enterprise, enjoying a long-term relational contract with the
corporation, while retail consumers contract with the corporation at arm’s length, and other people
living alongside the corporation do not contract with it at all. Under this organizational model, the
general public may participate in the team forming the corporate enterprise by providing public
financing. Indeed, corporate law was developed to protect public investors.
However, evidence shows that most of the listed equity is no longer held by the general public
directly; the new shareholders are institutional investors. This Article analyzes the impact of in-
stitutionalization on the interaction of corporations with the general public, outlining spheres of
potential divergence between institutional and retail investors and raising the timely concern for the
agency costs embedded in the relationship between the general public and institutional investors.
First, not all institutional investors are investing on behalf of the public. Shareholder empowerment
platforms are frequently mobilized by intermediaries representing only the wealthiest 1%. Second,
when shareholders are mostly institutional investors, the likelihood of distributional conflicts be-
tween various stakeholder groups is higher because the institutional thought and decision-making
patterns do not match those of the general public. The objectives of institutional investors are
significantly narrower than, and potentially divergent from, those of the general public. Third,
the technology used for trading by institutional investors, algorithmic trading, potentially imposes
externalities on retail investors, and ultimately widens the gap between corporations and the gen-
eral public. It may often be the case that the institutional interests align with those of the general
public, but the law does not necessitate it.
This Article further discusses converse trends towards convergence, including socially respon-
sible investments and impact investments, corporate social responsibility, sustainability reporting,
and customer voice. This Article ultimately suggests policy implications. When shareholders’
interests are not necessarily aligned with those of the general public, we have reason to revisit the
axiom of shareholder value as the underlying purpose of corporations, the boundaries of fiduciary
duty, and the limited platform and audience for sustainability reporting.
KEYWORDS: Shareholder, Stakeholder, Institutional Investors, Institutionalization, Corpora-
tion, Corporate Law, Agency
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Shlomit Azgad-Tromer* 
This Article explores the legal manifestation of the interaction 
between the general public and the public corporation. Revisiting 
team production analysis, this Article redefines the corporate team 
and argues that while several constituencies indeed form part of the 
corporate team, others are exogenous to the corporate enterprise. 
Employees, suppliers and financiers contribute together to the 
common corporate enterprise, enjoying a long-term relational 
contract with the corporation, while retail consumers contract with 
the corporation at arm’s length, and other people living alongside the 
corporation do not contract with it at all. Under this organizational 
model, the general public may participate in the team forming the 
corporate enterprise by providing public financing. Indeed, corporate 
law was developed to protect public investors. 
However, evidence shows that most of the listed equity is no longer 
held by the general public directly; the new shareholders are 
institutional investors. This Article analyzes the impact of 
institutionalization on the interaction of corporations with the 
general public, outlining spheres of potential divergence between 
institutional and retail investors and raising the timely concern for 
the agency costs embedded in the relationship between the general 
public and institutional investors. First, not all institutional investors 
are investing on behalf of the public. Shareholder empowerment 
platforms are frequently mobilized by intermediaries representing 
only the wealthiest 1%. Second, when shareholders are mostly 
institutional investors, the likelihood of distributional conflicts 
between various stakeholder groups is higher because the 
institutional thought and decision-making patterns do not match 
those of the general public. The objectives of institutional investors 
are significantly narrower than, and potentially divergent from, those 
of the general public. Third, the technology used for trading by 
institutional investors, algorithmic trading, potentially imposes 
externalities on retail investors, and ultimately widens the gap 
between corporations and the general public. It may often be the case 
that the institutional interests align with those of the general public, 
but the law does not necessitate it. 
                                                                                                                           
* University of California, Berkeley. This paper has benefited from the insightful 
comments of Amiram Gill, Sharon Hannes, and Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
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This Article further discusses converse trends towards convergence, 
including socially responsible investments and impact investments, 
corporate social responsibility, sustainability reporting, and customer 
voice. This Article ultimately suggests policy implications. When 
shareholders’ interests are not necessarily aligned with those of the 
general public, we have reason to revisit the axiom of shareholder 
value as the underlying purpose of corporations, the boundaries of 
fiduciary duty, and the limited platform and audience for 
sustainability reporting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“We are the 99%” is the political slogan of the Occupy Wall Street 
movement.1 The slogan refers to the wealth and income inequality 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Erik Kain, Outside of Wonkland, ‘We are the 99%’ Is a Pretty Good Slogan, 
FORBES (Oct. 12, 2011, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2011/10/12/o 
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prevalent in American society. Equally as important, the slogan 
symbolizes a divergence of corporate America from the public. 
Corporations are arguably the most significant legal institution in 
today’s society; they accommodate most of society’s commercial needs, 
provide employment opportunities, and have an immeasurable impact 
on public policy. Considering the dominance and power held by 
corporations, their potential divergence from the general public is not to 
be taken lightly. Nevertheless, the stakeholder theory of corporate law 
portrays the corporation as a sphere of cooperation and coordination 
between all stakeholder constituencies including the general public.2 
This Article explores the relationship of the general public with the 
public corporation and its legal manifestation in corporate law. 
This Article is organized as follows. Using the contractual model of 
the corporation, Part I introduces the stakeholder theory and team 
production analysis.3 This section argues that the corporation does not 
provide equal participation or representation to all stakeholder 
constituencies.4 Rather, the corporation’s financiers, suppliers, and 
employees form the corporate team and create the corporate value. In 
contrast, the corporation’s contractual relationship with the general 
public is at arm’s length, and for corporations with no retail consumers, 
there are often no contractual foundations at all.5 Under this 
organizational model, the general public assumes a role within the 
corporate team only to the extent that it provides public financing.6 
While in the past, the general public provided financing to public 
corporations and held securities in person, retail investors have now 
disappeared from direct ownership of listed corporations.7 Part II 
analyzes the impact of institutionalization, outlining the differences 
between retail and institutional investors with regard to shareholder 
activism, investment objectives, and trading mechanisms.8 First, 
                                                                                                                           
utside-of-wonkland-we-are-the-99-is-a-pretty-good-slogan/ [http://perma.cc/4FZW-
J9SG]. 
 2. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A 
Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 416-19 (1993). 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250, 256 (1999). 
 6. See infra Part I. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
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shareholder activism is often mobilized by hedge funds, representing the 
wealthiest 1%, with little participation by retail investors.9 Second, the 
investment objectives of institutional investors are significantly 
narrower than, and potentially divergent from, those of the general 
public, as not all institutional investors are investing on the public’s 
behalf.10 Banks and insurance companies, for example, contract with the 
general public under loan and insurance contracts. Their duties toward 
the general public are confined to their obligations to their consumer 
constituency, while they invest for the benefit of their own accounts. 
Therefore, institutionalization may significantly disadvantage retail 
investors, as much of the impact and voice given by the empowerment 
platforms are utilized by institutional investors and intermediaries who 
are not legally bound by the general public’s interests.11 Third, the 
institutional trading methodologies of algorithmic trading (“algo-
trading”) are technologically inaccessible to individuals, potentially 
imposing negative externalities on retail investors.12 Overall, 
institutionalization has demonstrated that shareholder empowerment 
does not empower all shareholders equally. 
Despite the divergence of corporations from the general public, Part 
III describes increasing trends towards convergence.13 This section 
surveys patterns of convergence between corporations and the general 
public, including investment paradigms that consider social progress in 
portfolio management, the corporate social responsibility movement and 
its corresponding effect on sustainability reporting, and the public 
corporation’s growing interest in the voice of the general public through 
social media and websites providing accumulated customer reviews 
such as Yelp.com.14 
Finally, the article concludes with policy implications and a 
proposal to reunite the 99% with the 1%.15 Understanding that the 
primary purpose of public policy should be to enhance aggregate social 
welfare, corporate law must face the challenge of aligning the interests 
                                                                                                                           
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.C. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
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of today’s institutional shareholders with those of the general public.16 
Because the general public no longer directly owns stock, the mandatory 
disclosure of nonfinancial performance and sustainability reporting 
should not be restricted to public corporations.17 Rather, these disclosure 
requirements should apply to corporations funded privately that serve 
public roles or provide public services. 
I. STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND TEAM PRODUCTION ANALYSIS 
Corporations are often theorized as bundles of contracts between 
various agents facilitating cooperation and coordination between 
participants in the corporate enterprise.18 The corporation is portrayed as 
a nexus of contracts, an organizational means of reducing contracting 
costs and inducing trust between the various contracting parties and 
corporate constituencies.19 Because corporate law is restricted to the 
corporate constituencies, the public participates in the legal institution of 
the corporation only insofar as it encompasses one of the constituencies 
such as the consumer. 
Under the stakeholder approach to corporate law, the corporation is 
an organizational platform for a set of relationships between groups that 
have a stake in a common enterprise. The purpose of the corporation is 
to create as much value as possible for all stakeholders, usually defined 
as groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist, 
including shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders, and 
society as a whole.20 Alternatively, a corporation’s stakeholders can be 
defined as those whose stake in the corporate enterprise contributes to 
                                                                                                                           
 16. See infra Part IV.A. 
 17. See infra Part IV.C. 
 18. See HENRY HANSMANN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, What is Corporate Law¸ in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH LAW 1, 6 (2d 
ed. 2009); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 19. See HANSMANN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 18; see also William W. Bratton, 
The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 
191 (1992). 
 20. See R. F. Stewart, J. K. Allen & J. M. Cavender, Stanford Research Institute, 
Long Range Planning Serv., Indus. Econ. Div., The Strategic Plan, Research Report 
168 (1963); R. EDWARD FREEMAN, JEFFREY S. HARRISON, ANDREW C. WICKS, BIDHAN 
L. PARMAR & SIMONE DE COLLE, STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART 
(2010); see also Giles Slinger, Essays on Stakeholding, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Cambridge) (arguing that “stakeholders” refers to all those who have a 
“stake” in the corporate enterprise and contribute to the success of the corporation). 
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the success of its business. 21 Stakeholder theory thus assesses the 
corporation as a platform for business endeavors designed to enable 
cooperation between various contributors and enhance its value for a 
wider community that includes not only the shareholders but also the 
customers, suppliers, employees, financiers (including shareholders, 
bondholders and banks), communities, and managers. The role of 
management is to shape and manage these relationships and perform the 
distributional allocation of resources and corporate activities among the 
various stakeholder constituencies.22 The following diagram 
demonstrates the juggling of corporate management among different 
stakeholder constituencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 1: Corporate Stakeholders23 
                                                                                                                           
 21. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 22. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, JEFFREY S. HARRISON & ANDREW C. WICKS, 
MANAGING FOR STAKEHOLDERS: SURVIVAL, REPUTATION AND SUCCESS 7 (2007). 
 23. See id. 
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Perhaps because of the wide array of agents taking part in the 
creation of value and its distribution through the corporate platform, 
some scholars find the justification of stakeholder accountability to be 
within the firm’s commitment to business ethics and social 
responsibility. Wesley Cragg, for example, argues that the corporation’s 
status as a social institution imposes private and public liability, 
accounting for stakeholder interests while pursuing shareholder profits.24 
In recognizing the diversity of stakeholders, the stakeholder theory 
advocates a holistic approach to management, integrating considerations 
that are considered ancillary by the conventional analysis of agency 
theory and shareholder primacy including social, political, ethical, and 
environmental considerations.25 Some scholars argue that the wider 
circle of stakeholders should also extend to wider stakeholder 
representation in management.26 Corporate management continuously 
engages in the distributional allocation of resources, and stakeholder 
theory provides a doctrinal foundation for greater social accountability. 
However, the notion of the ethical corporation under agency theory 
seems to be paradoxical; at some point there is a conflict between two 
choices: ethics without business or business without ethics.27 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout portray the corporation as a “nexus 
of firm-specific investments,” an organizational platform for team 
production, where several parties may pursue a joint enterprise within 
which each party contributes “unique and essential resources to the 
corporate enterprise . . . .”28 Under their team production model of the 
firm, it is the “horizontal interaction” that enables team members to 
collaborate and produce corporate value beyond the “sum of their 
                                                                                                                           
 24. See Wesley Cragg, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Theory, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
113 (2002). 
 25. See, e.g., R. Edward Freeman & S. Ramakrishna Velamuri, A New Approach to 
CSR: Company Stakeholder Responsibility, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
RECONCILING ASPIRATION WITH APPLICATION 9 (Andrew Kakabadse & Mette Morsing 
eds., 2006). 
 26. See, e.g., Charles W. L. Hill & Thomas M. Jones, Stakeholder-Agency Theory, 
29 J. MGMT. STUD. 131, 134 (1992). 
 27. J. R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: 
Or, What’s so Special About Shareholders?, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393 (1994); Kenneth E. 
Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 53, 53 (1991); 
Kenneth Goodpaster & T. Holloran, In Defense of a Paradox, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 423 
(1994). 
 28. Blair & Stout, supra note 5, at 275. 
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individual inputs.”29 Rather than “a bundle of assets under common 
ownership,” Blair and Stout suggest that the corporation is a mediating 
hierarchy of horizontal cooperation.30 As they describe it, “[p]erhaps one 
individual brings critical technical skills to the table, while another has a 
talent for management, and a third provides marketing insights.”31 
A team is a group of people with complementary skills who are 
committed to a common purpose, each with a distinct role in sharing 
culture, tasks and leadership.32 Indeed, some stakeholder constituencies 
conform to this model: shareholders often need employees and suppliers 
to engage in production while shareholders, employees, and suppliers all 
need the financiers to lend the enterprise a credit line. But stakeholder 
theory and team production analysis fail to reflect the distinct nature of 
the various relationships the corporation encompasses. In every 
corporation, several stakeholder constituencies are negotiating and 
cooperating towards a common goal, forming the insider corporate 
“team,” while other stakeholder constituencies are negotiating with the 
corporation at arm’s length, excluded from the core of the corporate 
platform.33 The horizontal cooperation enterprise is exclusively reserved 
for those parties contributing directly to the common corporate 
endeavor: those who are part of the team. 
In particular, the general public is not part of the team engaging in 
the corporate enterprise. The general public rarely has a seat at the 
corporate table. The public is absent from the corporate premises and 
lacks institutional representation in the corporation’s organizational 
form.34 With such a low percentage of retail investors, and a negligible 
                                                                                                                           
 29. Id. at 270. 
 30. Id. at 271-76. 
 31. Id. at 275. 
 32. JON R. KATZENBACH & DOUGLAS K. SMITH, THE WISDOM OF TEAMS: 
CREATING THE HIGH-PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATION (1993). 
 33. For an analysis of the effect of different social relationships on commercial 
contracts, see Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 877 (2000); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term 
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 
NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1977-1978); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN 
INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1981). 
 34. For a dramatic portrait of the seclusion of corporations from the general public, 
see JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGIC PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 
(2003). For a doctrinal analysis of the limited scope of corporate law, see Shlomit 
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percentage of retail investors actively trading, the public remains living 
alongside the corporation, occasionally wearing the consumer hat but 
mostly serving as a human background for the social and environmental 
externalities of the corporate enterprise. Stakeholder theory and team 
production analysis broaden the group of constituencies to which the 
corporation’s management is accountable, but they sustain the alienation 
of the general public from the corporate scene. The following is a 
diagram demonstrating the juggling of corporate management among 
different stakeholder constituencies, taking into account the nature of the 
contractual relationship between the corporation and the different 
stakeholder constituencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 2: Internal and External Stakeholders35 
II. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Once upon a time, most investors in the capital markets were 
individuals, but this is no longer the case.36 Investments in public 
                                                                                                                           
Azgad-Tromer, The Case of Consumer-Oriented Corporate Governance, 
Accountability, and Disclosure, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 227, 228-48, 285-90 (2015). 
 35. This illustration is an original design in order to provide a visual representation 
of the interaction between internal and external stakeholders. 
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corporations are now dominated by financial corporations, also labeled 
as “institutional investors.”37 In 1945, individual households directly 
owned 93% of outstanding corporate equities; by 2014, individuals held 
only 36%.38 Additionally, investments by individuals tend to be more 
passive: from April 2005 to August 2006, trades by individuals 
represented, on average, less than 3% of the NYSE trading volume for 
NYSE listed firms.39 Instead, institutional activism drives both trading 
volume and proxy voting.40 The public corporation is no longer public. 
Retail investments were the fuel for dispersed ownership, affecting 
the design of United States corporate governance. It was not until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century that most businesses were 
incorporated; in fact corporations played a negligible role in the 
nonfinancial sector of the American economy before that time.41 In 
1859, the nonfinancial corporations’ share of national wealth is 
estimated to have been only about 7%.42 Initially, the economy was 
dominated by self-funded, small, family businesses. People trusted their 
own endeavors. For example, the farmer invested in her farm and the 
shoemaker invested in his street stand. Incorporation gained popularity 
in the 1840s and 1850s when funding for the railroads required public 
financing through security issuances. Later, from 1880 until World War 
                                                                                                                           
 36. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization 
of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009). 
 37. Id. 
 38. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE: Z.1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL 
ANNUAL TABLES 1945-1954, at 121 tbl. L.223 Corporate Equities (1) (2015), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1945-1954.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6DN8-PHY9] [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE, 
1945-1954]; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE 
STATISTICAL RELEASE: Z.1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FIRST 
QUARTER 2015, at 119 tbl. L.213 Corporate Equities (1) (2015), http://www.federalrese 
rve.gov/releases/z1/20150611/z1.pdf [http://perma.cc/YK8V-GK6H] (the data cited 
refers to the fourth quarter). 
 39. See Alicia J. Davis, Do Individual Investors Affect Share Price Accuracy? 
Some Preliminary Evidence 36-38 (Univ. of Mich. L. Sch. Empirical Legal Studies 
Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-018, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=998093 [http://perma.cc/RN9C-3XDK]. 
 40. See generally id. 
 41. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE STOCK – A BACKGROUND STUDY 
35 (Raymond W. Goldsmith ed., 1973). 
 42. Id. 
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I, incorporating again resurfaced, as the rapidly expanding 
manufacturing, mining, electric power, and communication sectors 
sought public funding through the corporate issue of stock, bonds and 
other debt.43 
Individual investors funded the rise of corporations in America.44 
However, since individual investors have been leaving the securities 
markets, institutional investors have become the dominant owners of 
securities in America. Below is an illustrative graph of the share of 
households and institutions, respectively, in total equities outstanding, in 
the period between 1964 and 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 3: U.S. Households Percent Share of Total Holdings of Equities45 
Institutional investors are financial corporations; some of whom 
invest on behalf of their clients directly and some of whom do not. 
Pension funds and mutual funds, for example, invest on behalf of their 
clients. Consumers trust these financial institutions to manage their 
savings, and these institutions are obliged to act as fiduciaries for their 
clients and beneficiaries.46 Saving on the institutional platform is 
encouraged by tax incentives, through which governments enhance the 
                                                                                                                           
 43. Davis, supra note 39, at 39-40. 
 44. Federal Reserve data from the 1940’s show that more than 90% of outstanding 
equity was held by individual household investors. See FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL 
RELEASE, 1945-1954, supra note 38. 
 45. SIFMA, 2015 SIFMA FACT BOOK 61 tbl. U.S. Holdings of Equities. 
 46. See generally, Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: The 
Law of Financial Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2014). 
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institutionalization of capital markets and empower institutional 
investors.47 
Other institutional investors, such as commercial banks and 
insurance companies, invest sums they collect from their consumers, 
either as a loan or as a premium.48 These institutional investors do not 
invest on behalf of their clients, instead the return or loss from their 
investments is credited to their own account. Eventually, the 
beneficiaries are the shareholders of the institution. Typically, 
institutional investors are more heavily regulated than other 
corporations, with financial regulators often imposing specific leverage 
and minimum capital requirements, due to the vulnerability of financial 
markets and the need to secure financial stability.49 An exception to the 
highly regulated regime of financial institutions is hedge funds, which 
often adopt speculative and high-risk strategies, and frequently engage 
in active investments, sometimes effecting major changes in the 
strategy, management, or structure of public firms.50 
The difference between retail investors and institutional investors 
makes a significant impact on the nature of our capital markets. The 
remainder of this section surveys the impact of institutionalization on 
shareholder activism, investment objectives, and trading methodologies. 
                                                                                                                           
 47. Such tax incentives are common in most western societies. JOHN C. BOGLE, 
THE CLASH OF THE CULTURES: INVESTMENT VS. SPECULATION 29-31 (2012); see also 
Immacolata Marino, Filippo Maria Pericoli & Luigi Ventura, Tax Incentives and 
Household Investment in Complementary Pension Insurance: Some Recent Evidence 
from the Italian Experience 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 247, 247-63 (2011). 
 48. The formal definition for a bank is a firm taking deposits and making loans – 
on a contractual basis. The relationship of the depositor with the bank is based on a 
consumer contract. Likewise, consumers of insurance policies are purchasing the 
insurer’s contingent liability upon the insurance event. Insurance companies and banks 
thus invest their own funds collected from their consumer. On the other hand, mutual 
funds are pooled investment vehicles, investing on their clients’ behalf. See, e.g., 
Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An 
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L. REV., 319, 327-331 (1999). 
 49. HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., THE REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1999); Anat R. Admati, The Compelling Case for Stronger 
and More Effective Leverage Regulation in Banking, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 41 (2014). 
 50. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007). 
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A. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
Individuals are dispersed investors with little incentive to act 
individually on the corporate scene due to both the size of their expected 
returns and collective action problems. Because individuals have small 
and diversified portfolios, they are typically “rationally apathetic” 
towards their securities holdings.51 Institutional investors, however, have 
larger stakes and are thus more likely to engage actively in the corporate 
scene. Indeed, institutionalization is famed for “shareholder activism,” 
which has disciplinary effects on the companies that institutional 
investors hold, and often leads to changes in governance.52 
Institutional investors have a strong impact on the corporations they 
hold. These investors create this impact either by simply selling their 
large number of shares and voting with their feet, or by voting against 
corporate decisions, which can lead to amendments in governance or to 
hostile takeovers.53 Institutional investors also form coalitions and 
industry organizations, such as the Council of Institutional Investors, 
providing a platform for cooperation in legal, governance, and strategy 
issues.54 The Financial Times declared 2013 the year of “the triumph of 
activism,” and Barron’s called it the year that “activist investing had 
entered a golden age.”55 
To be sure, not all institutional investors are active. Many 
institutional investors are “sleeping giants,” and are notably passive due 
to a variety of barriers, including free-riding, conflicts of interest, and a 
                                                                                                                           
 51. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 89 (2012). 
 52. See Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer & Josef Zechner, Large Shareholder 
Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1097, 
1097-1130 (1994). 
 53. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and 
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2245, 2246-49 
(2009). 
 54. See, e.g., About Us: Corporate Governance Advisory Council, Council of 
Institutional Investors, CII (2013), http://www.cii.org/cgadvisorycouncil 
[http://perma.cc/2R7F-AHRB]. 
 55. Brian R. Cheffins, The Team Production Model as a Paradigm 37 (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 262/2014, 2014) (citing Stephan Foley, The 
Brave New World of Investor Activism, FIN. TIMES (U.S.) Dec. 24, 2013, at 15 and Avi 
Salzman, How to Profit From Today’s Shareholder Activism, BARRON’S, Nov. 30 2013, 
at 25). 
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common fee structure.56 In practice, third-party intermediaries play a 
major role in mobilizing activism and defining its agenda.57 Activists 
function as arbitrageurs, creating value by amplifying the institutional 
investor voice.58 However, not all activists are bound by duties to the 
general public or have their interests aligned with it. Of the various 
activist agents, hedge funds are particularly prominent: between 2009 
and 2014 they launched campaigns at more than one-fifth of companies 
in the S&P 500.59 According to FactSet research, 60% of proxy fights 
prompted by a hedge fund activist that went to an actual vote in 2013 
resulted in at least a partial activist victory.60 The peril of hedge fund 
activism has prompted a change in the governance of public 
corporations even before they have been targeted.61 Managers of public 
companies start to “look at (their) company through the lens of an 
activist.”62 Public companies are now offering board representation to 
activists who have not even launched proxy contests for board seats.63 
Proxy contests and shareholder activism led by hedge funds have 
fostered a “really enhanced investor outreach” in public companies.64 
However, hedge funds are not investing on behalf of the general public. 
Usually, investment in hedge funds is exclusively restricted to investors 
with a net worth of $1 million or more.65 
                                                                                                                           
 56. See Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund 2-9 (Aug. 22, 2014) (unpublished 
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 58. See id. at 901. 
 59. See The Barbarians Return to the Gate, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2014, at 10. 
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 61. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 833, 910 (2005). 
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 63. Cheffins, supra note 55, at 38. 
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Investors, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK, Nov. 12, 2013, at F10). 
 65. See Getting Started: How to Buy Hedge Funds, MARKETWATCH, http://www.m 
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Under agency theory, it is beneficial to empower the principals 
thereby reducing the agency costs of discretion by the appointed 
management. Thus, empowering shareholders with more discretion is 
strongly advocated by scholars working within the agency theory 
paradigm.66 However, shareholder empowerment does not empower all 
shareholders equally. As previously mentioned, retail investors hardly 
trade and are mostly apathetic towards actively using disciplinary 
corporate governance through proxies.67 Those institutional investors 
that are investing on behalf of the general public are more inclined to 
make centralized voting decisions based on how all of their funds will 
vote, generally exercising less activism.68 As Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court Leo E. Strine Jr. writes, “[T]he segment of the 
investment community that is best positioned to vote with an eye toward 
sustainable value creation is the least active in exercising voice and 
judgment in American corporate governance . . . .”69 Additionally, 
conflicts of interest may arise between retail investors and hedge funds, 
which are prominent agents of shareholder activism, because “hedge 
funds frequently engage in hedges and other sophisticated trading and 
arbitrage strategies.”70 The alignment of interests between those active 
shareholders and the general public remains to be questioned.71 
Activism may often enhance aggregate social welfare even in the 
absence of fiduciary duties imposed on the activist agent vis-à-vis the 
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general public. For example, empirical research suggests that in the five 
years following activist interventions by hedge funds, target companies 
demonstrated improved operating performance, contradicting claims of 
a detrimental effect on the long-term interests of corporations and their 
shareholders due to divergent investment objectives and horizons.72 
Moreover, some asset managers are actively involved in corporations 
held on their clients’ behalf. Recently, for example, BlackRock Inc. and 
the Vanguard Group, respectively the largest and third largest United 
States asset managers, with more than $7 trillion in combined assets 
under management, have made public statements emphasizing that they 
are focused on corporate governance and board engagement.73 
Additionally, much of the voice generated on behalf of the general 
public is mobilized by active intermediaries such as Harvard’s 
Shareholders Rights Project. From 2012 to 2013, the group was 
responsible for over 50% of all successful precatory proposals by public 
pension funds and over 20% of all successful precatory proposals.74 
Therefore, while it may often be the case that an activist’s interests align 
with those of the general public, the law does not necessitate this 
outcome. 
B. INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES 
A second point of divergence between retail and institutional 
investors is their investment objectives. Institutional investors are bound 
to enhance financial value; indeed, that is the legal purpose of their 
institutionalization.75 Some institutional investors do act on their clients’ 
behalf, such as a mutual fund or a pension fund. But these institutional 
investors are similarly gauged by their consumers on the basis of their 
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 74. Shareholder Rights Project News Alert, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT (Oct. 
29, 2013), http://srp.law.harvard.edu/newsletters 
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 75. See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 
181 (2013). 
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ability to make investments that yield better economic returns. Several 
institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, 
have grown such enormous and highly diversified portfolios that their 
interests in long-term macroeconomic prosperity are significant, as their 
returns are likely to reflect the financial performance of the market and 
the global economy as a whole.76 These large and long-term institutional 
investors are sometimes titled “universal owners.”77 As of 2014, $17 
trillion was being managed by open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, 
exchange-traded funds and unit investment trusts, on behalf of 98 
million United States investors.78 However, only a minority of these 
institutional investors are socially responsible funds that cater to 
investors who have social objectives other than profit-making, such as 
fair labor practices, environmental sustainability, and the promotion of 
moral values.79 The majority of institutional investors continue to ignore 
environmental, social, and governance criteria in their investment 
allocations.80 
Unlike corporations, individuals always have additional stakeholder 
capacities on the corporate scene. For example, a retail investor may be 
living in the neighborhood of the corporation’s factory and suffering 
pollution. Retail investors may also be the corporation’s customers. 
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Individuals, as Stout says, “are not just investors. They are also 
consumers who buy products, citizens who pay taxes, and organisms 
who breathe air and drink water . . . .”81 Additionally, “real human 
beings care about much more than just whether . . . stock rises. They 
also want to protect the value of their other investments, keep their jobs, 
lower their tax bills, and preserve their health.”82 
The discrepancy between individual and institutional shareholders 
is somewhat offset by the individual representation of institutional 
investors on boards of directors. The board is comprised of individual 
members, appointed by institutional shareholders. As Stout shows, these 
individual members of the board are committed to the corporation’s 
purpose even in the absence of substantial incentives.83 Few scholars 
consider the breadth of director discretion under the business judgment 
rule that is wide enough to encompass any lawful business consideration 
in addition to shareholder wealth, including decisions made in favor of 
the consumers, the employees, the environment, and the society as a 
whole84 However, these appointed human members of the board are 
agents with a mission to represent their principal, a profit-seeking 
institutional investor. Only shareholders elect directors and may sue to 
enforce directors’ fiduciary duties.85 As Chief Justice Leo Strine Jr., 
writes, “[w]hen only one constituency has the power to displace the 
board, it is likely that the interests of that constituency will be given 
primacy.”86 Their motivation and decision making process is likely to 
conform to the principal’s expectations.87 When the principal’s voice is 
mobilized by an activist intermediary, that intermediary’s interests are 
likely to serve as a lighthouse for the corporation, whether these 
interests are aligned with those of the general public or not. 
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Because the objectives of corporations are narrower than those of 
individuals, prudent corporate governance should regulate the 
relationship between institutional investors and their beneficiaries more 
closely to ensure accountability for the public’s interests. The Group of 
Twenty (“G20”) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) recognized the risk of divergent interests 
between institutional investors and the public, and in 2013, they issued 
principles encouraging policies that give pension funds incentives to 
align their investment strategies with their beneficiaries’ specific 
interests. The G20 and OECD specifically noted the beneficiaries’ 
strong interest in the long-term growth of not only the pension fund 
portfolio but also the wealth of the nation in which they live, taking into 
account the wider individual interests of retirees.88 Still, however, the 
question regarding the extent to which board members conform to 
shareholders’ expectations lies at the heart of corporate law scholarship, 
and corresponds to the power struggle between boards and shareholders 
over control of the corporation.89 
C. INVESTMENT ALLOCATION AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
Institutional investors are more likely than individuals to pursue 
their investment purpose in a comprehensive and deliberate manner.90 
Institutional investors are also more likely than individuals to act as 
rational agents, and to collect and analyze the full information provided 
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in order to support the investment allocation decision.91 Institutional 
investors are indeed a legal construct of the textbook homo economicus 
model: unlike individuals, they serve as an organizational platform for 
carrying out the economic vision of rational actors to its full potential.92 
While corporate law and securities regulation continue to protect 
the bounded rationality of retail investors, institutional investors 
professionally collect all of the required information for a thorough 
analysis and investment allocation even in the absence of mandatory 
disclosure platforms. As Professor Donald Langevoort explains: 
[T]hroughout the SEC’s history and culture, the rhetorical stress has 
been on the plight of average investors, ones who lack investing 
experience and sophistication so as to need the protection of the 
securities laws . . . The subsequent history of rules, interpretations 
and enforcement by the SEC is filled with references to both the 
need to promote retail-level investor confidence . . . and the desire to 
level the playing field between the meek and the privileged.93 
Langevoort conducts a thought experiment asking whether, in the 
absence of retail investors, securities markets could emerge and be 
governed by antifraud policy only, as opposed to the intense mandatory 
disclosure regime offered by securities regulation today.94 Five years 
later, Elizabeth de Fontenay gave this thought experiment an empirical 
answer in the affirmative, showing that leveraged loan markets are 
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functioning as well as bond markets without any disclosure 
requirements imposed on the borrowing corporation.95 
The implication of this empirical study is that institutional investors 
do well in collecting requisite information and negotiating their 
investments even in the absence of mandatory securities disclosures.96 
Howell Jackson and Eric Pan have shown that the institutional investors 
in Securities Act Rule 144A transactions request and receive disclosures 
similar to those available in registered offerings.97 Institutional investors 
can either do without it or use it when it is available. The American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ Special Committee on 
Financial Reporting has noted that investors generally find the business 
reporting system in the United States to be working well and providing 
“users with essential information that heavily influences their 
decisions.”98 Retail investors, on the other hand, are less likely to delve 
through the bounty of information available at online SEC databases 
such as EDGAR.99 Recent empirical studies suggest disclosure is an 
inefficient policy for altering individual behavior due to the reluctance 
to analyze the overload of information.100 Individual investors can be 
overwhelmed with such copious, complex information, and the sheer 
volume of disclosures available on EDGAR alone surpasses human 
capacity. 
D. TRADING METHODOLOGIES 
Institutional investors are not only better at collecting and 
analyzing information but also are better at utilizing more efficient 
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trading methodologies. In recent years, institutional investors have 
frequently used automated platforms for trading by coding a trading 
algorithm according to predetermined variables. Algo-trading 
technology is used by institutional investors to improve performance on 
both risk management and expected return.101 Algo-trading is precise 
and informative, and has been shown to narrow spreads, reduce adverse 
selection, and reduce trade-related price discovery, all of which 
generally improves the liquidity of markets and makes quotes more 
informative.102 Retail investors, on the other hand, are heavily 
influenced by past performance and tend to make trading decisions on 
their own, underperforming benchmarks and selling winning 
investments while holding on to losing ones.103 
Most algo-trading institutional investors engage in high-speed 
trading, where a program automatically trades faster than humans can 
respond to data.104 Algo-trading thus generates negative externalities on 
retail investors: when others become faster, adverse selection costs for 
slow investors increase.105 This result reflects informational asymmetries 
between large, fast institutional traders and small, slow retail traders.106 
E. SOCIETAL IMPACT 
The divergence between retail and institutional investors is 
particularly significant in light of the everyday impact that corporations 
and their management decisions have on individuals. Corporations serve 
a prominent role in society. The public is both heavily influenced and 
dependent on the continuous supply of products and services provided 
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by corporations. Banks are essential for monetary services and credit. 
Other corporations supply the public with energy, electricity, and gas, 
run major hospitals, provide public transportation, broadband services, 
and basic foods, and much more. 
Corporations often meet our cultural expectations of life. Everyday, 
managements within corporations make financial and functional 
decisions that impact the environment as well as product quality, 
employee rights, and the financial results of the corporations. Profits 
may often be realized by imposing externalities on other stakeholder 
constituencies of the corporation or on the general public. Cutting back 
on safety expenditures, decreasing employee wages, or reducing 
adherence to environmental standards can all improve stock 
performance, but this added value for shareholders can also be harmful 
for other constituencies of the corporation.107 For institutional investors, 
however, this is rarely of interest.108 
III. TOWARDS CONVERGENCE 
Despite the substantially divergent grounds of corporations and the 
general public, there has been an increasing trend towards convergence. 
Part III briefly surveys the major streams of convergence: socially 
responsible and impact investments, corporate social responsibility, 
sustainability reporting, and customer voice platforms. 
A. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS AND IMPACT INVESTMENTS 
As of 2014, one out of every six dollars invested by institutional 
investors who are professional fund managers is reported to take into 
account sustainable, responsible and impact investing (SRI) 
considerations.109 There is no method for tracing how these 
considerations actually affected the investment allocation performed by 
money managers between increasing the rate of return and social 
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responsibility. Although only a minority of fund managers have been 
willing to embrace the larger social mission thus far, even if it is only 
through legally unenforceable statements of their intentions, the number 
continues to grow.110 A 2008 study found that socially responsible funds 
are visible in the proxy process, yet they generally do not receive 
majority support.111 By 2012, however, environmental, social, and 
governance issues “constituted the majority of all shareholder 
proposals.” 112 
Concerned that capitalism is not capable of undertaking the 
problems facing the economy, investors have been accumulating funds 
to invest in impact investments that not only provide a return on 
investment, but also target specific social needs and maximize social 
goals in general.113 A subset of socially responsible investments, impact 
investments seek to allocate funds to particular social goals and projects 
while also finding the economic rationale.114 While traditional, socially 
responsible investments securitize the investment allocation based on 
profit considerations and alter it when externalities exceed the profit to 
investors, impact investments seek to create both social and economic 
value.115 
B. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY116 
Corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) refers to the trend among 
for-profit corporations of voluntarily adopting extracurricular activities 
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for the benefit of the “other,” including other non-profit organizations 
and philanthropies, weak stakeholder groups (such as consumers), or 
civil society and the needs of the general public as a whole. Ideas about 
CSR emerged in Europe in the interwar period, between 1918 and 1939, 
when a few large stock corporations began to dominate the economies 
of the West.117 While shareholders of large corporations in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were often personally involved 
in managing or monitoring the corporation, by the beginning of the 
twentieth century they were typically absent from management or 
production, assuming a passive role, becoming widely dispersed, and 
taking little interest in the daily management of the business.118 
Ownership and control were separated, and corporations were left to the 
leadership of their hired professional managers.119 Accordingly, 
shareholders were seen as less central to the corporate ethos, becoming 
“anonymous pensioners,” possessing claims to “get something for 
nothing” as “absentee owners.”120 
CSR originally posed a fundamental challenge to the paradigm of 
shareholder primacy, regarded as “a radical reconceptualization of the 
corporation of the nature of the corporation . . . underlain by the belief 
that is was perfectly legitimate to subordinate the interests of 
shareholders to those of other groups, or of society as a whole.”121 
Contemporary writers on CSR have adopted a softer approach in which 
the social liabilities of corporations are seen as an ameliorative 
commitment to shareholders and their property rights.122 As such, ideas 
of CSR are seen as a legitimizing tool for corporate externalities, 
tempering inequalities in wealth and income that the core property 
emphasis on shareholders’ rights and privileges would stress, through 
self-regulation, voluntarism and “soft-law.”123 
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The backdrop to the emergence of CSR concepts was the rise of 
managerial agents as prominent organs of the corporation whose owners 
are passive and widely dispersed. In a series of public correspondences 
between Adolf Berle and American corporate lawyer E. Merrick Dodd 
from the early 1930s, Berle argued that the fiduciary duties of managers 
should be enhanced to prevent the preference of controlling groups of 
shareholders over minority groups.124 Dodd suggested that once the 
corporation is an independent entity separate from its owners, rather 
than an aggregate of stockholders, “there was no reason why it should 
not operate through its managerial agents, as a ‘good citizen . . . with a 
sense of social responsibility.’”125 Dodd advocated a view of the 
corporation not as a purely private enterprise, but as a wider 
organization with social responsibilities and obligations.126 By the 
1950s, shareholder primacy was seen as “slightly old-fashioned,”127 and 
managers were perceived as being in charge of balancing the interests of 
different groups connected with the “soulful,” socially responsible 
corporation.128 In the 1960s, Berle explicitly rejected shareholder 
primacy by describing corporate managers as “administrators of a 
community system.”129 Shareholder primacy returned to dominance with 
the rise of neoliberal ideology in the financial markets of the 1980s and 
1990s.130 Fiercely believing in the forces of the market as efficient and 
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as the primary facilitator of wealth, neoliberals employed every means 
to deregulate and eliminate governmental intervention in the forces of 
the free market.131 Shareholders in this period were less dispersed and 
came to be represented by only a few institutional investors as claims for 
shareholder activism and shareholder value became stronger.132 
CSR is often justified from the shareholder value perspective in that 
improving environmental and social performance will serve the best 
long-term interests of investors, thereby enhancing the overall 
shareholder value.133 Under the “doing well by doing good” theory, 
promoting the needs of other stakeholders can improve financial 
performance.134 For example, employee training and product 
development leads to better product quality.135 
In Individual and Corporate Responsibility, Ronald Bénabou and 
Jean Tirole discuss three alternative visions of CSR.136 Vision 1 is the 
“win-win” approach, under which the incentive for CSR stems naturally 
and inherently from the promotion of shareholders’ interests in 
profits.137 When firms fail to accommodate CSR, they in fact reduce 
shareholder value by focusing on the short term.138 Bénabou and Tirole 
give the example of a firm that may reduce costs by reneging on a 
contract with its labor or suppliers so as to reduce costs, which would 
damage the long-term goodwill of the different constituencies, making it 
more difficult to either attract motivated employees or induce suppliers 
to make long-term investments.139 
CSR under this first vision is in fact a means of maximizing profits 
and enhancing shareholder value in the long run. The academic support 
for CSR often comes from the value it brings to shareholders such as 
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greater access to finance or a heightened corporate reputation.140 CSR 
was found to have a small, yet significant, positive impact on 
profitability.141 Recently, sustainable organizations, defined as 
organizations that voluntarily integrated social and environmental issues 
into their business model strategy, were found to outperform their lower 
sustainability peers over an eighteen-year horizon, both in stock markets 
and in operational performance.142 
Of course, there is no consensus on this win-win approach. Because 
the corporation is a distributional platform, stakeholder constituencies 
do not always have aligned interests. Companies engaging in 
environmental and social issues might underperform and “be eliminated 
by competitors who choose not to be so civic minded, or will survive 
only by consuming their economic rents in this manner.”143 Paying more 
to employees and engaging in environmental mitigation can often 
enhance agency costs, implying negative financial implications for the 
corporation.144 “The social responsibility of business is to increase its 
profits,” according to Milton Friedman,145 but today’s investors seem to 
care about the broader CSR and ethics issues, often considering it a 
potential concern that can translate into financial consequences.146 
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A recent empirical study explored the impact of CSR ratings on 
sell-side analysts’ assessments of firms’ future financial performance.147 
It found that in the early 1990s, analysts issued more pessimistic 
recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings, but in more recent 
years, analysts progressively assess these firms less pessimistically, and 
eventually, optimistically.148 Everyone wants to fly the cheapest airline 
as consumers, earn better wages as employees, and receive higher 
returns as investors, but the corporation has a bounded supply of 
resources and often becomes a platform for distributional justice. 
Vision 2 is labeled “delegated philanthropy” by Bénabou and 
Tirole.149 Under this view, the firm is a channel for the expression of 
different constituencies, and the corporation’s management caters to 
demand by supplying the stakeholders’ need to engage in charity while 
maximizing profit.150 As Bénabou and Tirole point out, it is necessary to 
explain why the corporation is the adequate social vehicle for this 
philanthropy.151 In theory, Starbucks’s consumers could send charitable 
donations directly to the workers in the coffee plantations.152 The 
explanation Bénabou and Tirole suggest is transaction cost savings.153 
Since the corporation is already involved in a transaction with the 
workers, it is much cheaper for it to forward them the donation.154 
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Bénabou and Tirole label Vision 3 “insider-initiated corporate 
philanthropy.” This vision reflects management’s personal need or 
willingness to contribute money to a good cause and using “others’ 
money” for that purpose.155 
As it currently stands, CSR is a voluntary practice. In a 
communication from the European Union, CSR is defined as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis.”156 Voluntary commitments are, alas, limited in their 
strength and ability to create incentives for legal compliance. It is often 
argued that corporate commitment to ideas of CSR is largely empty.157 
For example, the Christian Aid Report, Behind the Mask: The Real Face 
of Corporate Social Responsibility, lists a string of transgressions by 
corporations that “espouse voluntary approaches” to CSR 
commitments.158 This list includes Shell, which officially strives to be a 
good neighbor but “fails to quickly clean up oil spills that ruin villages;” 
British American Tobacco, which stresses its commitment to high 
standards of health and safety but is reported to have “chronic ill-health 
related to tobacco cultivation;” and Coca-Cola, which states it uses 
“natural resources responsibly” but is claimed to have a “wholly owned 
subsidiary in India [that] is accused of depleting village wells in an area 
where water is notoriously scarce.”159 
Perhaps due to the lack of external standardization, CSR is often 
considered a public relations endeavor, where the real value given to 
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society is not comparable to the negative externalities imposed on the 
public. Destruction of nature and of social morality may be justified 
with meager donations, with no real estimation of the cost-benefit 
analysis from the general public’s perspective. Like the Once-Ler in The 
Lorax who rationalizes his corporation’s destruction of the environment 
by singing, “How ba-a-a-ad can I be? A portion of proceeds goes to 
charity,”160 CSR provides corporations with a narrative of societal 
consciousness that allows them to rationalize harmful corporate 
behavior. For example, a corporation failing to return debt to creditors 
may hurt millions of retirees while enjoying the status of a CSR 
promoter due to a meager donation to the preschool of the CEO’s 
daughter. CSR allows tax deductions for the – often minor – expense 
and provides great public relations value. “All the customers are 
buying,” sings the Once-ler, “and the PR people are lying.”161 
Mandatory CSR is not common in the western world but was 
recently adopted in China and India. In China, Article 5 of the Company 
Law requires companies to “undertake social responsibility” in the 
course of business.162 In 2013, India adopted a corporate law that 
requires large companies to invest in sustainable initiatives and engage 
in CSR activities with two percent of their average net profits.163 
C. SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
Sustainability reporting is a method of nonfinancial information 
management. It requires the reporting of information about 
environmental, social, and corporate governance performance. A 
company must provide this information to investors through a 
systematic platform “at par with financial reporting in terms of rigor, 
credibility and comparability.”164 Sustainability reporting is thus the 
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transparency platform for assessing the nonfinancial performance of 
corporations. 
The history of sustainability reporting is rather short and runs back 
to the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, after which the Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”) introduced 
environmental reporting guidelines on behalf of the Social Investment 
Forum (“SIF”).165 The Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”) was launched 
in 1997 by CERES and the United Nations Environmental Program 
(“UNEP”), proposing an alternative “triple bottom line” accounting for 
economic, social, and environmental corporate performance.166 It is 
becoming highly customary for public corporations to disclose 
sustainability information. By 2013, more than 6,000 companies were 
issuing sustainability reports,167 with 499 of the 500 S&P 500 companies 
having either made a sustainability disclosure or linked financial 
performance with a sustainability initiative.168 Sustainability indices and 
funds emerged at stock exchanges,169 and a new C-level executive 
position was established in many companies to oversee sustainability-
related issues.170 
Lately, an increasing number of nations are mandating corporate 
disclosure of environmental, social and governance information.171 As of 
2015, mandatory non-financial disclosure regulations are prevalent in 
Denmark, South Africa, China, Malaysia, Brazil, Hong Kong, and 
India.172 As of 2013, United Kingdom regulations require that large, 
publically traded corporations file “strategic reports,” which must 
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include information about corporate performance indicators, which 
effectively measure the company’s business position and its 
performance, as well as information about environmental matters, the 
company’s employees, social community, and human rights issues.173 A 
recently published study suggests that mandatory sustainability 
disclosures are associated with increases in firm valuations.174 Like any 
disclosure regime, sustainability reporting is likely to affect the ex-ante 
incentives of the management of reporting corporations in areas of 
performance that are subject to disclosure.175 
Mandatory disclosures of nonfinancial information only apply to 
publicly traded corporations, due to their public funding rather than their 
public function or importance. Listed corporations are typically larger, 
and the public funding may well correlate with the public role of 
corporations. However, applying sustainability only to listed 
corporations surely misses some privately funded corporations with 
significant public roles. Applying the enhanced disclosure regime to a 
narrow group of corporations that are of interest to investors overlooks 
those corporations that are significant to the wider and more diverse 
general public. 
Sustainability is the business of society as a whole, not only of 
investors. A study by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board 
found that “50 percent of disclosures related to environmental and social 
issues [were] immaterial [to] the future long-term financial performance 
of the company.”176 The target audience of sustainability reporting is the 
general public, but in practice, sustainability reporting is typically 
integrated or adjusted to the financial reporting and directed at the 
investor base.177 Nonfinancial information on corporate performance is 
available on EDGAR, which is used mainly by institutional investors.178 
The significant amount of nonfinancial information falls mostly on the 
institutional investors’ deaf ears. As shown earlier, institutional 
investors are mostly reluctant to engage with the nonfinancial aspects of 
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investments.179 The general public is hardly aware of information 
available at EDGAR. A small percentage of the trading public is made 
up of individuals, and of these few, even fewer read the corporate 
filings. 
D. CUSTOMER VOICE 
When consumers speak, corporations should listen, especially since 
consumers share information with one another. Word-of-mouth 
consumer advice is one of the most effective marketing strategies. We 
are all more inclined to purchase what our peers and social 
acquaintances enjoy and recommend. The effectiveness of the consumer 
voice can be attributed to both a cognitive bias that causes us to over-
evaluate the easily accessibility and the reliability of a peer review from 
a disinterested party who typically has no clear conflict of interest with 
us, unlike corporate retailers. 
With the abundance of Internet platforms, consumers are able to 
share information with one another cheaply and quickly. In addition, 
they are able to distribute their advice to a far larger group than that in 
their immediate physical proximity. Internet platforms enable consumers 
to share their reviews about the products and services they have used, 
and to pass that knowledge to future consumers who are faced with a 
consumption choice.180 Typically, both the participation in information 
sharing and the consumption thereof are available to all, free of charge, 
online. 
The Internet digitally revives Habermas’s lost public sphere, which 
refers to a mezzanine sphere between the state and society where people 
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come together and engage in noncompulsory conversation.181 The 
traditional communication environment dictated an asymmetry of 
information between sellers and consumers. This asymmetry was 
enabled by the scarcity of access to media as well as the structure of the 
markets, with dispersed consumers who were unable to act collectively 
and share information with one another. Conversely, the Internet 
provides a framework for costless collective consumer discussions and 
sharing of information. 
Unlike twentieth-century communication spheres, which were 
modeled on a few influencers talking to the public (few-to-many), the 
Internet is a stage open to all where anyone may talk at will (many-to-
many). In addition, listeners are able to search electronically through the 
mass of information and find that which is most relevant to them. 
Customers speak directly, not only to their sellers in the customer 
service lane, but also to their peer consumers, on a variety of social 
media websites and in the framework of diverse consumer communities 
that develop online. These communities are digital meeting places where 
consumers who share similar needs can share their experiences with one 
another.182 Structurally, the Internet provides a communal framework for 
consumption, where each consumer can share her experience with all 
others, and future consumers of a product can learn from the experience 
of the product’s previous consumers by a simple web search, even when 
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such other consumers are total strangers living in different cultures and 
continents. 
Under the traditional consumption model, the asymmetry between 
sellers and consumers has led to the characterization of the consumer as 
an antihero, an insignificant part of the crowd who lacks any unique 
skills regarding the object of consumption and rarely takes a significant 
role in facilitating the consumption transaction.183 But today, the 
argument for asymmetry of information has weakened. The Internet is 
the ultimate framework for the expression of the wisdom of the crowds, 
and it has the potential to move toward a utopian model for consumer 
organizations and for consumer influence on commercial life.184 The 
consumer is regaining dominance: she knows more about each of her 
purchased products, and voices her opinions about them, posting her 
consumption experience in a public arena exposed for all Internet users 
to see.185 The consumer thereby strengthens the incentives of 
corporations to gratify consumers and listen to their voice by increasing 
the stakes of reputational damage. In fact, in 2006, TIME chose the 
consumer, i.e., the reader, as the “Person of the Year.”186 
Sellers can easily censor unfavorable and unwelcome reviews on 
their own company websites, and are strongly incentivized to do so; 
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however, they are exposed to a variety of platforms, forums, and social 
media, which document consumer complaints and expose unfavorable 
information to a wide public of prospective customers. One web 
platform for consumers’ commercial speech that merits a closer look is 
Yelp.187 A contraction of yellow pages, Yelp provides product 
information about businesses in various categories, including dining, 
entertainment, retail, travel, and professional services throughout the 
United States. In a typical search, performed from any web browser, 
including those on mobile devices, consumers define what they are 
seeking (e.g., an auto body shop), and the location in which the search is 
to be performed (neighborhood, city, or zip code). In response, Yelp 
provides a list of businesses, each accompanied with a five-point 
average consumer rating, reviews from other consumers, and general 
contact information, including the business address, hours and parking 
options. 
Yelp is a dynamic source of product information, boosted by a 
vibrant community of users, some of whom have a reputation for being 
reliable, prolific, and/or tasteful in their consumption habits. Users have 
their own pages listing their previous reviews, thereby enabling other 
users to follow their consumption habits and opinions, contributing to 
the creation an online community of consumers. With over 83 million 
cumulative reviews of local businesses, Yelp creates an abundance of 
consumer knowledge.188 However, this consumer utopia is not to be 
overrated. Yelp solicits business owners to join a “Sponsorship 
Program” that allows businesses to bring a favorite review to the top of 
the page.189 According to its 10-K filings for 2013, Yelp generates 
revenue primarily from the sale of advertising on its website and mobile 
app to small businesses.190 
Because customer opinion significantly impacts sales, some 
corporations have adopted a more intense listening regime by taking 
customer complaints into serious and immediate consideration. 
Corporations have demonstrated an effort to create customer satisfaction 
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and avoid the ill effects of web-based negative customer speech, and 
have also attempted to listen to their customers directly, bypassing both 
Yelp and social media platforms. Accordingly, supporting mobile 
applications were recently developed to allow direct communication 
between the retail consumers and the corporations.191 Some of these 
applications have features that allow corporations to track conversations 
taking place on social networks, news websites, blogs and forums, 
allowing customer support agents to know whether they need to engage 
with customers immediately in order to resolve issues or complaints.192 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. THE PURPOSE OF CORPORATE LAW: INVESTOR PROTECTION AND 
SOCIAL WELFARE 
Corporate governance rules were designed to enhance public 
funding by providing adequate protection to investors. There are two 
rival systems of corporate governance. The first is a concentrated 
ownership system that is characterized by controlling block 
shareholders, high private benefits of control, and weak securities 
markets with low disclosure and market transparency standards.193 The 
second is a dispersed ownership system that is characterized by strong 
securities markets, rigorous disclosure standards, and high market 
transparency.194 In the dispersed ownership system, the market for 
corporate control constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism.195 
Share ownership in the United States remains dispersed in most large 
public companies, and it is rare to find a single shareholder owning 
more than 5% of a big public firm, despite the rise of institutional 
investors.196 Legal scholars debate the merits of each of these systems 
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and whether this dichotomy can persist in an increasingly competitive 
global capital market.197 
In particular, corporate law scholars debate the origins of dispersed 
ownership. Professors Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanos, and 
Andrei Shleifer place legal variables at center stage, arguing that the 
legal foundations for investor protection are the fuel behind public 
investments in corporations.198 They find that countries with weaker 
investor protections, measured by both the character of the legal rules 
and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital 
markets.199 These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. 
Research suggests that French civil law countries have both the weakest 
investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially 
as compared to common law countries.200 Harvard law professors 
Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe offer an alternative theory: 
[T]he corporate structures that an economy has at any point in time 
depend in part on those it had at earlier times. . . . First, the corporate 
structures of an economy depend on the structures with which the 
economy started. Initial ownership structures have such an effect 
because they affect the identity of the structure that would be 
efficient for any given company and because they can give some 
parties both incentives and power to impede changes in them. 
Second, corporate rules, which affect ownership structures, will 
themselves depend on the corporate structures with which the 
economy started. Initial ownership structures can affect both the 
identity of the rules that would be efficient and the interest group 
politics that can determine which rules would actually be chosen.201 
Alternatively, Columbia law professor John Coffee turns to a 
political explanation, suggesting that the principal variable in the 
development of dispersed ownership in the United States and the United 
Kingdom was the separation of the markets from politics in the late 
nineteenth century, placing control in the discipline of the markets rather 
than in the hands of controlling shareholders.202 
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Regardless of the origins of dispersed ownership, it is dispersed 
ownership that shaped corporate law. Modern corporate law was 
designed to expand the family business and provide the legal 
foundations for mass investment in other people’s businesses, fueling 
the growing economy.203 Whether as a means of enhancing public 
investments, or as a means of reducing contractual costs for business 
cooperation by providing a cheaper organizational platform for the 
requisite nexus of contracts, corporate law provides the foundations for 
investor protection in incorporated business endeavors. 
The basic legal characteristics of the business corporation–legal 
personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management 
under a board structure, and investor ownership–all conform to the 
investor protection motivation of corporate law.204 By permitting the 
corporation to function as a single contracting party, a “separate 
patrimony” distinct from the individuals who own it and their assets, 
corporate law reduces the cost of lending to the corporation and protects 
creditors.205 Asset partitioning reduces the cost of capital by isolating 
separate lines of credit and allowing better evaluation and monitoring of 
the shielded entity by potential creditors.206 Limited liability, which “has 
become a nearly universal feature of the corporate form,” protects equity 
investors by shielding shareholders’ assets from the corporate asset pull 
in case of corporate failure.207 Transferable shares provide investors an 
exit from their investments, allowing liquidation and diversity of the 
investment portfolio, and lowering the risk in commitment to 
investment. The separation of ownership and control, and the delegation 
of management to a board of directors, provide further investor 
protection by forming a “mediating hierarchy” committed to 
professional management for running the common business of the 
corporation and its shared pull of assets.208 In public corporations with a 
majority of independent board members, investor protection is further 
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enhanced by providing a commitment to impartial leadership.209 Finally, 
investors are protected by default rules providing them control of the 
firm through exclusive voting rights, and they retain the right to receive 
the firm’s residual net earnings in proportion to the amount of capital 
contributed to the firm.210 
The underlying motivation to protect retail investors is also 
apparent in the tendency to enact financial legislation in times of 
crisis.211 For example, “[t]he Future Trading Act of 1921, the first 
federal statute regulating commodity futures markets, was enacted in the 
wake of the most severe recession in the United States up to that 
time.”212 The federal securities laws enacted in the 1930s were a 
response to the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression.213 
Yale law professor Roberta Romano suggests that similar circumstances 
attended the initiation of the Sarbanes-Oxley governance mandates as 
well.214 Historical research suggests that financial legislation during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the United Kingdom and the 
United States was adopted “only after stock market declines, which, by 
1837, coincided with economic contractions.”215 Crises have spurred 
political action to craft emergency financial legislation aimed at saving 
the public. 
Considering the goal of corporate law, this underlying motivation 
to protect retail investors is of particular interest. The general normative 
objective of all fields of law is presumably to increase the aggregate 
welfare of society−the whole social pie−thereby serving the best 
interests of the entire human population.216 In corporate law, most 
scholars work under the assumption that the corporation’s purpose is to 
serve the best interest of shareholders and, more specifically, to enhance 
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shareholder value by increasing the market price of shares.217 This 
precedence of shareholders’ interests is not established on a normative 
distributional preference. If shareholders were to enrich themselves at 
the expense of making other stakeholders worse off, there would be little 
academic support for the gain.218 Yet, the platform for investor 
protection provided by corporate law and securities regulation now 
serves the institutional investors. 
Using shareholder value as a heuristic for social value is based on 
the residual nature of shareholder interests and the identical character of 
shareholders as representatives of the public. If a particular agent is 
getting only the last piece of the pie, that agent has strong incentives to 
make sure the pie is as large as possible to begin with.219 “[A]s the 
firm’s residual claimants and risk bearers [shareholders] have a direct 
pecuniary interest in making sure that corporate transactions are 
beneficial, not just to the shareholders, but to all parties who deal with 
the firm.”220 Shareholder value draws primary attention because it seems 
to serve as a heuristic for the aggregate social pie. As Bebchuk writes: 
My support . . . is not motivated by political ideas but rather by the 
goal of making a market institution–the modern publicly traded 
company–function better. . . . I support a viable shareholder power to 
replace directors only because I view it as a valuable instrument for 
enhancing shareholder value by making boards more accountable 
and more attentive to shareholder interests.221 
Additionally, in the words of Judge Frank Easterbrook and 
University of Chicago law professor Daniel Fischel: 
[M]aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other 
“constituencies” automatically. . . . A successful firm provides jobs 
for workers and goods and services for consumers. . . . Wealthy 
firms provide better working conditions and clean up their outfalls; 
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high profits produce social wealth that strengthens the demand for 
cleanliness.222 
But this logic does not take into account the identity of 
shareholders. When shareholders are retail investors, and therefore 
members of the general public, they always have additional capacities, 
for example, as consumers, or even as persons living in the 
corporation’s neighborhood that is potentially affected by its business. 
When shareholders are institutional investors, they usually have a single 
purpose in mind: increasing profits for their own or their client’s 
accounts. Individual shareholders reduce the likelihood of conflicts of 
interest between various stakeholder groups. 
Consider, for example, two road-paving companies. In Company A, 
shareholders are mostly individuals. In Company B, shareholders are 
mostly institutional investors. Shareholders of Company A drive to work 
and live in the areas that Company A paves. If the corporation pollutes, 
the shareholders and their children breathe the polluted air. If the 
corporation paves a noisy road, shareholders’ work suffers the risk of 
distraction. If the corporation fails to assess the transportation volume 
accurately, shareholders sit in traffic. In addition to considering their 
own interests in their other capacities with the corporation, individual 
shareholders frequently make decisions that take into account payoffs to 
others, act altruistically, and are “extremely sensitive to the signals . . . 
about the expectations, needs, attitudes, identities and likely behavior of 
the people around us.”223 Shareholders in Company B are institutional 
investors. Generally, institutional investors are solely interested in the 
rates of return and only a minority take additional considerations into 
account. Using individual shareholders’ interests as a heuristic for 
aggregate social welfare makes sense when looking at the potential for 
distributional conflicts between various stakeholder groups. But when 
the shareholders are mostly institutional investors, as in the case of 
Company B, the likelihood of distributional conflicts between various 
stakeholder groups is higher because the spectrum of objectives taken 
into account by institutional investors does not match individuals’ 
thought processes and decision-making patterns. Therefore, it does not 
make sense to use institutional investors’ interests as a heuristic for the 
aggregate social welfare. 
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An alternative justification for shareholder primacy involves 
contracting costs.224 Creditors, employees, and customers have fixed 
claims on the corporation and thus could obtain suitable protection and 
better information enabling them to remain indifferent to the policy 
adopted by the management.225 Shareholders’ residual claims, in 
contrast, have an open-ended association and thus should be entitled to 
leveraged protection, as they are most likely to be affected by corporate 
policy.226 But this argument also applies to the 99%, who live alongside 
the corporation and are directly impacted by its externalities. If the 
open-ended association is the argument for primacy, then the general 
public should be the primary corporate constituency. 
B. BOUNDED FIDUCIARY DUTY 
The reluctance of institutional investors to engage in nonfinancial 
investment considerations is legally rooted in their bounded fiduciary 
duties.227 Institutional investors trading on behalf of their clients and 
advising their clients’ securities selection are bound by fiduciary duties, 
under either the federal securities laws or the common law of agency, or 
both.228 Fiduciary duties are aimed at mitigating the agency costs caused 
by the divergent interests and risk tolerance of the client and the 
institutional investors representing her.229 
The core fiduciary duties are loyalty and care. The duty of loyalty 
regulates potential conflicts of interest and proscribes misappropriation, 
while the duty of care establishes a professional benchmark for 
“reasonableness” and “prudence.”230 Yet, despite the broad spectrum of 
human objectives, the United States Department of Labor clarified in a 
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2008 Labor Bulletin that ERISA prohibits investment decisions based 
on nonfinancial factors.231 Institutional investors are bound to enhance 
financial value; indeed, that is the legal purpose of their 
institutionalization.232 Bridging the gaps between ethics and business is a 
challenge, as the objectives and methods of both often face conflicts in 
investment allocation. Perhaps due to fear of political intervention, or 
the potentially substantial cost of aligning social and financial goals into 
one socially responsible investment policy, the policy guiding the 
pension savings under ERISA purposefully blinds itself to the 
underlying human interests of its clients.233 
Back in the 1980s, ethical investments used “negative screening,” 
banning investments in enterprises based on religious or political 
divergence. For example, in Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals upheld Baltimore City Ordinance No. 765 
banning pension funds’ investments in companies doing business in 
South Africa.234 The risk of subverting investors’ interests into politics 
has raised an academic debate, with most scholars accepting the view in 
the Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005 report.235 The report concluded 
that pension funds are legally required to consider environmental, social, 
and governance considerations if there is a clear consensus amongst 
beneficiaries in favor of this criterion or the criterion is believed to be 
financially beneficial.236 However, this is a high bar to overcome; 
therefore, the bottom line is that environmental, social, and governance 
considerations remain secondary to the financial interest. 
In the years following the most recent financial crisis, responsible 
investment strategies became more widely adopted. In 2009, a report by 
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the asset management group of the United Nations Environmental 
Program Finance Initiative stated, “Fiduciaries must recognise that 
integrating [environmental, social and governance] issues into 
investment and ownership processes is part of responsible investment, 
and is necessary to managing risk and evaluating opportunities for long-
term investment.”237 This report framed the environmental, social, and 
governance investment considerations as a proactive obligation of 
institutional investors that is inherent to their professional duties.238 
According to the report, failure to comply with this obligation may be 
considered negligence.239 In 2014, Institutional Shareholder Services 
issued policy guidelines for voting on SRI environmental, social and 
governance issues.240 Later that year, a collection of academic essays 
broadly interpreting fiduciary duties was published as the Cambridge 
Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty, dismissing 
the belief that fiduciary duties are essentially an obligation to maximize 
short-term returns, and instead focusing on long-term societal value.241 
Yet, it is important to remember that many institutional investors 
are not bound by any fiduciary duty to the general public in their 
investment decisions.242 Banks and insurance companies invest for their 
own accounts, and although they are contractually tied to the consumer 
public, they are not investing on its behalf. Hedge funds are fiduciaries 
of the 1% rather than 99%. Fiduciary duties do not cover investments 
where the general public is not the principal. The remodeling of 
fiduciary duties should be extended to bind institutional investments 
even when the general public is under other stakeholder constituencies. 
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C. PLATFORM AND AUDIENCE FOR SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 
The target audience for sustainability reporting is the general 
public. Sustainability reporting aims to bring to the public condensed 
and systemic information regarding the non-financial performance of 
corporations. Yet, sustainability data is still limited to the financial 
reporting available on EDGAR, where institutional investors are 
generally the only parties accessing and reading such disclosures. Even 
when sustainability reporting becomes mandatory, it typically applies 
only to listed corporations.243 Despite being a disclosure platform based 
on stakeholder theory, sustainability reporting is typically adopted only 
in public corporations. Corporations may have a major role in society 
and provide essential services and products to the public, but when 
funded privately, are exempt from any accountability to public 
transparency regarding their performance. 
Because the target audience for sustainability reporting is wider 
than the investor constituency, sustainability reporting should be voiced 
through additional platforms to reach the general public. Mandatory 
regulations imposing sustainability reporting obligations should apply to 
corporations holding public roles or providing public services, even 
when funded privately. 
CONCLUSION 
Stakeholder theory and team production analysis theorize corporate 
law as team production law, providing an organizational platform for 
various stakeholder constituencies.244 Yet, in the scholarship of 
stakeholder theory, no attention is devoted to the nature of the 
corporation’s relationships with the various stakeholder constituencies. 
Unlike financiers, employees, and suppliers, the 99% contract with the 
corporation at arm’s length, as its end consumers, or do not contract 
with it at all, simply coexisting alongside the corporation. 
Under this organizational model, the general public may participate 
in the corporate enterprise only by providing public financing. However, 
this Article outlined the impact of institutionalization on the interaction 
between the general public and the public corporation because the 
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general public no longer holds listed equity directly. Not all institutional 
investors are investing on behalf of the public, and shareholder 
empowerment platforms are frequently mobilized by intermediaries 
representing only the wealthiest 1%. The objectives and methods used 
by institutional investors are potentially divergent from those of the 
general public, and potentially impose negative externalities on retail 
investors. The prominence of institutional investors, and the differences 
between institutional investors and retail investors, increase the 
likelihood of potential conflicts of interest between the shareholders and 
other stakeholder constituencies of the corporation. 
This Article described increasing trends towards the convergence of 
public corporations with the general public. Impact investments, social 
responsible investments, CSR, sustainability reporting, and customer 
voice all represent commitments to enhancing corporate accountability 
towards the 99%. 
This Article analyzed these trends and raised policy implications. 
Corporate law must face the challenge of aligning shareholders’ 
interests with those of the general public. In a world of institutional 
investments, enhancing shareholder value is not always a good heuristic 
for aggregate social welfare. In addition, as the general public is no 
longer serving in the shareholding constituency while the target 
audience of sustainability reporting is the general public, sustainability 
reporting should not be restricted to public corporations; rather, 
sustainability reporting should apply to corporations serving significant 
public roles even when funded privately. 
The contribution of this Article is in raising the timely concern for 
the agency costs embedded in the relationship between the general 
public and institutional investors. When shareholders’ interests are not 
necessarily aligned with those of the general public’s, we have reason to 
revisit the axiom of shareholder value as the underlying purpose of 
corporations, and accordingly reconsider the design of corporate law. 
